internal-comms
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it encourages the agent to ingest and summarize content from external communication tools that may contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points:
examples/3p-updates.md,examples/company-newsletter.md, andexamples/faq-answers.mdidentify Slack, Google Drive, Email, and Calendar as primary data sources. - Boundary markers: None are specified; the agent is not instructed to ignore embedded commands or use delimiters when processing retrieved data.
- Capability inventory: The agent is tasked with aggregating, summarizing, and formatting internal data for broad distribution (SKILL.md).
- Sanitization: The instructions lack any requirement for input validation, sanitization, or filtering of the content retrieved from external sources.
Audit Metadata