reviewing-skills
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to process and analyze untrusted data from other skill directories, which creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
SKILL.md,agents/openai.yaml, and various script/reference files from a user-provided directory path. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions to wrap the untrusted content in delimiters or to ignore instructions contained within the analyzed files.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute
gitcommands and is suggested to usenpxfor validation, providing a path for injected instructions to influence system state. - Sanitization: While it has a policy to redact secrets, it does not sanitize instructions or escape content that could override the agent's behavior.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves executing several shell commands to gather context from the local environment.
- Evidence: The skill uses
git remote show origin,git diff <base> -- <skill>/, andgit logto analyze the target directory's history. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The evaluation rubric suggests the use of external tools that are downloaded and executed at runtime.
- Evidence:
references/skills-rubric.mdmentions runningnpx skillcheck <skill>andnpx agnix <skill>as optional validation steps. These commands download and execute packages from the npm registry. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs broad filesystem reads within the target directory.
- Evidence: It reads multiple files including
SKILL.md, configuration files, and scripts. Although it has a 'Secrets' policy to redact credentials, the capability to read and process local files could be abused if the agent is compromised via injection.
Audit Metadata