paperless-ngx

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The SKILL.md file employs aggressive instructional language, such as '⚠️ MANDATORY SKILL INVOCATION ⚠️' and statements that failure to invoke the skill 'violates your operational requirements.' These patterns are designed to coerce the AI agent into specific behaviors and override its default tool-selection logic.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates via several Bash scripts (paperless-api.sh, tag-api.sh, correspondent-api.sh, bulk-api.sh) that use curl and jq to perform network operations and process data. These scripts provide a significant capability surface for interacting with local files and remote APIs.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The upload and download commands in scripts/paperless-api.sh facilitate the movement of data between the local file system and a remote server. While intended for document management, these tools allow the agent to read local files for upload or write remote content to local paths.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. It retrieves OCR-extracted text from documents via the search and get commands in scripts/paperless-api.sh. This untrusted data is fed directly into the agent's context.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/paperless-api.sh (search results and document details).
  • Boundary markers: None; the scripts do not wrap OCR content in delimiters or include instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has extensive capabilities including file-write (download), file-read (upload), and deletion/modification of data on the remote server.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the text content extracted from the document management system.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 7, 2026, 05:32 PM