mcp-builder
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The
MCPConnectionStdioclass inscripts/connections.pyutilizes thestdio_clientto spawn subprocesses. It accepts arbitrarycommand,args, andenvparameters. - Evidence:
stdio_client(StdioServerParameters(command=self.command, args=self.args, env=self.env)) - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): Because the
create_connectionfactory function is designed to handle various transports dynamically, an agent instructed by untrusted input could be coerced into running a malicious local command under the guise of starting an MCP server. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (MEDIUM): The
MCPConnectionSSEandMCPConnectionHTTPclasses allow connections to arbitrary URLs. Without a domain whitelist, this capability can be used to exfiltrate data or perform SSRF attacks against internal network resources. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): This skill represents a high-risk capability surface. If the agent processes external data (like a website description of a 'useful MCP server') and uses that data to populate the
commandorurlfields increate_connection, it will execute the attacker's payload.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata