pdf-brain
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core workflow of processing untrusted data from a document corpus and using it to generate actionable system commands.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the
joelclaw docs searchandjoelclaw docs contextcommands inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to disregard instructions that might be embedded within the retrieved document snippets.
- Capability inventory: The skill generates
k8s/infra movesandverification commands(e.g., shell commands and config paths) based on the processed data. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the corpus content before it is interpolated into the prompts used to generate the final commands.
Audit Metadata