qiaomu-opencli-browser

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the Bash(opencli:*) tool to interface with a local browser automation daemon, providing a broad interaction surface with the host system.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is explicitly configured to "reuse existing login sessions," allowing the agent to access private user data from any authenticated website. Commands such as network --detail and get html facilitate the extraction of this data, which could include PII or session secrets.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The "Sedimentation" feature allows the agent to write TypeScript code to ~/.opencli/clis/ and execute it via the verify command. This enables the creation and execution of persistent local code based on agent-determined logic.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external websites through state, get text, and network commands, creating a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection. 1. Ingestion points: Browser interaction commands (state, get text, get html, network) in SKILL.md. 2. Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety warnings for processing external content. 3. Capability inventory: Shell command execution via Bash and filesystem Write access for script generation. 4. Sanitization: Absent. No sanitization logic is prescribed for data retrieved from the web.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 03:05 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — qiaomu-opencli-browser