qiaomu-opencli-usage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an extensive surface for indirect prompt injection attacks by processing data from untrusted external websites.
- Ingestion points: The skill facilitates reading content from over 79 platforms, including social media feeds (Twitter, Reddit, Facebook), search results, and arbitrary URLs via
opencli web read(as documented inSKILL.mdandcommands.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack boundary markers or explicit guidance for the agent to distinguish between tool instructions and data retrieved from external sites.
- Capability inventory: The agent is encouraged to execute shell commands (passthrough to
gh,docker,lark-cli), post to social media (opencli twitter post), and modify local source files (the "Self-Repair" section inSKILL.mdinstructs the agent to fix adapter source code files). - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization or validation of the external content before it is processed by the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to install an external, third-party package
@jackwener/openclifrom the npm registry to function. While this is the core tool of the skill, it introduces a dependency on external code maintained by a third party. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute shell commands using the OpenCLI tool. This includes a "passthrough" feature that allows the agent to run subcommands for other powerful CLI tools such as GitHub (
gh), Docker, and Vercel, extending the agent's execution capabilities.
Audit Metadata