agent-mail
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The core functionality involves agents reading and processing message content (
body_md) from other agents, which may be influenced by untrusted external data. - Ingestion Points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through the
/api/mail/inboxand/api/mail/searchendpoints inSKILL.md. - Boundary Markers: The skill lacks any definition of delimiters or instructions for the agent to disregard instructions embedded within message bodies.
- Capability Inventory: Agents using this skill have the ability to reserve/release files (
/api/files/reserve) and send messages, providing a clear path for an injection to cause side effects in the project environment. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or content filtering for the markdown bodies being exchanged.
- Command Execution (LOW): The skill relies on the execution of
curlcommands. While the targets arelocalhost, the use of parameters likeproject_pathandagent_namein the command strings could be vulnerable to shell injection if these values are sourced from untrusted inputs without proper escaping.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata