NYC

agent-mail

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The core functionality involves agents reading and processing message content (body_md) from other agents, which may be influenced by untrusted external data.
  • Ingestion Points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through the /api/mail/inbox and /api/mail/search endpoints in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary Markers: The skill lacks any definition of delimiters or instructions for the agent to disregard instructions embedded within message bodies.
  • Capability Inventory: Agents using this skill have the ability to reserve/release files (/api/files/reserve) and send messages, providing a clear path for an injection to cause side effects in the project environment.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or content filtering for the markdown bodies being exchanged.
  • Command Execution (LOW): The skill relies on the execution of curl commands. While the targets are localhost, the use of parameters like project_path and agent_name in the command strings could be vulnerable to shell injection if these values are sourced from untrusted inputs without proper escaping.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 12:43 AM