NYC
skills/johnlindquist/claude/mcp-spy/Gen Agent Trust Hub

mcp-spy

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (HIGH): The skill accesses sensitive log files located in ~/.claude/debug/. These logs contain full message histories, tool parameters, and server responses, which may include private user information or internal data.
  • Evidence: Multiple commands target ~/.claude/debug/mcp-*.log for reading and filtering.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill encourages the use of the --dangerously-skip-permissions flag when running the claude CLI. This flag is designed to bypass security prompts that require user approval for tool execution, significantly increasing the risk of unauthorized actions.
  • Evidence: time claude --print "Run beads_ready" --dangerously-skip-permissions 2>&1 | head -1.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill demonstrates an indirect prompt injection surface by taking raw, untrusted data from log files and interpolating it into a new prompt for a different AI model (Gemini).
  • Evidence: Ingestion point: $(grep "request" ~/.claude/debug/mcp-*.log | tail -1) interpolated into a validation prompt.
  • Boundary markers: None present; raw content is directly injected.
  • Capability inventory: Shell execution (bash), local network access (curl), and log reading.
  • Sanitization: None provided; the log content is passed directly to the model.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill utilizes several system utilities (lsof, ps, node, curl) to monitor and interact with local processes and network ports.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:04 PM