baoyu-danger-x-to-markdown

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [External Downloads] (MEDIUM): The skill's primary execution method is npx -y bun, which automatically downloads the bun runtime and other necessary packages from the npm registry if they are not already present. This introduces a dependency on external, unverifiable code at runtime.
  • [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The SKILL.md instructions require the agent to execute multiple Bash commands, including cat, test, and mkdir. These are used to manage a consent flow and configuration files (consent.json and EXTEND.md) in the user's home and application data directories.
  • [Data Exposure & Exfiltration] (LOW): The skill accesses and manages sensitive authentication data. It specifically resolves and interacts with paths in ~/Library/Application Support (macOS) and %APPDATA% (Windows) to store X cookies and browser profile data. While used for the skill's intended purpose of scraping X content, this involves handling credentials that could be targeted for exfiltration.
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill ingests untrusted data from X tweets and articles which is then formatted into Markdown for the agent.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent via API responses fetched in scripts/thread.ts and scripts/tweet-article.ts.
  • Boundary markers (absent): The generated Markdown lacks explicit instructions or delimiters to warn downstream LLM processes to ignore instructions embedded within the tweet content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via npx and perform file system operations.
  • Sanitization (partial): While the skill includes basic Markdown escaping for alt-text (e.g., escapeMarkdownAlt), it does not sanitize the main body of tweets against potential prompt injection attacks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:27 PM