baoyu-post-to-wechat

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The file scripts/md/utils/languages.ts uses dynamic import() to load and execute JavaScript from https://cdn-doocs.oss-cn-shenzhen.aliyuncs.com. This allows for arbitrary code execution if the CDN or the transport is compromised.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The script scripts/paste-from-clipboard.ts executes powerful system automation commands including osascript (macOS), xdotool/ydotool (Linux), and powershell.exe (Windows). These tools are used to send simulated keystrokes to the OS, which is a high-risk capability that can be abused to control the user's desktop environment.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): In scripts/md-to-wechat.ts, the downloadFile function fetches remote images from arbitrary URLs found in Markdown files and saves them to the local filesystem (os.tmpdir()). This can be used for server-side request forgery (SSRF) or local file exhaustion.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): Multiple scripts, including scripts/md-to-wechat.ts, use spawnSync to execute npx bun and other shell commands to render content, increasing the attack surface for command injection if input parameters are not properly sanitized.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill processes untrusted Markdown content provided by users.
  • Ingestion points: Markdown files are read in scripts/md-to-wechat.ts.
  • Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are present to prevent embedded commands in processed text.
  • Capability inventory: File system write access, network downloads, subprocess spawning, and OS-level keystroke automation.
  • Sanitization: Lacks comprehensive sanitization of URLs and frontmatter fields before processing.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:25 PM