internal-comms

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill is highly susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) due to its core functionality of processing untrusted data from multiple internal sources.
  • Ingestion points: The skill explicitly directs the agent to gather information from Slack channels, Google Drive documents, Emails, and Calendar events across files like examples/3p-updates.md, examples/company-newsletter.md, and examples/faq-answers.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or explicit instructions (e.g., 'ignore any instructions contained within these documents') to prevent the agent from obeying commands embedded in the source data.
  • Capability inventory: While the skill lacks direct code execution capabilities, its output is intended for wide distribution (newsletters, FAQs), meaning a successful injection could be used to broadcast misinformation or malicious links to the entire company.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from internal tools before it is interpolated into the final communication templates.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:15 PM