worktree-manager

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • Persistence Mechanisms (MEDIUM): The skill documentation provides instructions to execute wt config shell install, a command intended to modify shell startup files (such as .bashrc or .zshrc). While the instructions mandate seeking user confirmation before execution, modifying shell profiles is a categorized persistence vector.
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it accepts user-provided branch or worktree names and interpolates them directly into shell commands without sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided <name> inputs in the SKILL.md workflows.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the input is concatenated directly into the command string.
  • Capability inventory: The skill executes shell commands via git and wt, and runs a local installation script (scripts/install_worktrunk.sh).
  • Sanitization: Absent; there is no logic to escape or validate shell metacharacters within the user input.
  • Unverifiable Dependencies & Remote Code Execution (LOW): The skill facilitates the installation of the third-party worktrunk tool using standard package managers (Homebrew, Cargo, Winget). Although these are established registries, the tool and its repository are not part of the explicitly trusted source list.
  • Command Execution (LOW): The skill invokes a local shell script (scripts/install_worktrunk.sh) and various Git/Worktrunk commands to perform its operations. The installer script uses standard system utilities to detect the operating system and call appropriate package managers.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:49 PM