BmadOrchestrate
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 7, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of system shell commands to manage git worktrees and tmux sessions for workflow automation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In
Workflows/Execute.md, the agent utilizestmux send-keysto programmatically inject and execute commands into background terminal panes, which involves dynamic command assembly. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly directs the use of the
--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag when invoking theclaudeCLI. This action intentionally bypasses the security model of the underlying tool, permitting it to perform file modifications or command executions without explicit user authorization or confirmation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because the
Workflows/Analyze.mdworkflow ingests and processes untrusted data from local project files, such asepics.mdand story-specific markdown files. Evidence chain: (1) Ingestion points:Analyze.mdreads multiple markdown files from the project repository; (2) Boundary markers: None are defined to separate instructions from data; (3) Capability inventory:Execute.mdhas the capability to trigger subprocess execution and file writes via the automated sub-agent; (4) Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested content is performed. Maliciously crafted content in these project files could influence the orchestration logic to execute unintended or harmful commands. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs local network requests via
curltolocalhost:8888for notifications, which represents a telemetry and command execution surface if an unauthorized service is listening on that port.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata