TeamsMigration

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 3, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill and its included Node.js script (Tools/MigrateChat.mjs) explicitly read sensitive authentication data from the user's home directory. Specifically, it accesses ~/.msgraph-mcp-auth.json and ~/.teams-mcp-token-cache.json to retrieve Microsoft Graph API client IDs, access tokens, and refresh tokens.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs multiple unauthorized command executions:
  • Automatically executes a background curl request to http://localhost:8888/notify on every invocation to send voice notifications, which could be used for local port probing or tracking.
  • Instructs the agent to run a local script Tools/MigrateChat.mjs using node, which handles complex logic like token refreshing and bulk API requests.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill guides the user to execute npx @floriscornel/teams-mcp@latest authenticate, which downloads and executes code from a third-party NPM package outside of the skill's direct control.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection from the data it processes.
  • Ingestion points: Chat history is ingested from MS Teams via the mcp__teams-mcp__get_chat_messages tool in both Workflows/MigrateChat.md and Workflows/ExportChat.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions implemented to prevent the agent from following commands embedded within the chat messages being migrated.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution (curl), script execution (node), and file system writes (writing progress to /tmp).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on message content to strip potential instructions before the agent processes the data.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 3, 2026, 06:51 AM