browser
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Data Exposure & Exfiltration (HIGH): The script
start.jscontains logic to locate and recursively copy the user's local Chrome profile directory (Defaultfolder) to a temporary location when the--profileflag is used. This directory contains highly sensitive information including session cookies, browsing history, and potentially saved passwords. - Evidence in
start.js:getUserDataDir()identifies paths like~/Library/Application Support/Google/ChromeandcpSync(defaultProfile, join(tempProfile, 'Default'), { recursive: true })performs the copy operation. - Dynamic Execution (MEDIUM): The
eval.jsscript uses the JavaScripteval()function to execute strings provided as command-line arguments within the browser context. - Evidence in
eval.js:return await eval((async () => ${expr})());. This allows an agent to execute arbitrary code in the browser, which is particularly dangerous when combined with the authenticated profile cloning. - Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill provides the ability to navigate to arbitrary external URLs (
nav.js) and evaluate script on those pages. This creates a surface where a malicious website could provide instructions that the agent might follow using the high-privilege browser tools provided. - Evidence Chain: Ingestion point in
nav.js(external URLs), capability inventory ineval.js(arbitrary JS execution), and missing sanitization/boundary markers when processing page content.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata