bugzilla

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill possesses a high-risk attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The agent retrieves untrusted data from bugzilla.mozilla.org through commands like search and get (documented in SKILL.md and references/api-reference.md).
  • Capability inventory: The skill includes the attachment command which can read local files and upload them to the web, and the update command which modifies remote state. This combination allows for side-effects based on processed data.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings are present in the examples provided to the agent for handling bug descriptions or comments.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of external content before it is processed by the agent's logic.
  • [Data Exfiltration] (HIGH): The attachment command (uv run "$BZ" attachment <id> <file>) allows the agent to read arbitrary local files and transmit them to the Mozilla Bugzilla servers. If an attacker leverages an indirect prompt injection via a bug comment, they could force the agent to upload sensitive configuration files or SSH keys.
  • [Command Execution] (LOW): The skill relies on executing a local Python script (bz.py) via the uv run command. While this is the intended functionality, it grants the agent the ability to execute shell commands with user-provided arguments.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 09:04 AM