latchbio-integration
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions promote the use of the
latchCLI for critical operations includinglatch login,latch init, andlatch register. The registration process involves local Docker containerization and serialization of Python code for remote execution on the Latch platform. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the
latchPython package from the official Python Package Index (PyPI). It also references official resources fromlatch.bioandgithub.com/latchbio/latch. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Experimental data is ingested through
LatchFile,LatchDir, and structured Registry tables (references/data-management.md). - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within ingested files (e.g., CSV metadata, FASTA comments) are present.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute system commands via the CLI, register new workflows (
latch register), and modify cloud data records (Record.update). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content within ingested files before they are processed or presented to the agent context.
Audit Metadata