docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pyimplements a sophisticated runtime compilation and process injection mechanism. It writes C source code to a temporary file, compiles it into a shared library usinggcc, and then uses theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to shim thesoffice(LibreOffice) process. This is intended to provide a fallback forAF_UNIXsockets in restricted execution environments.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple components of the skill utilize thesubprocessmodule to execute external system commands. This includes runningsofficefor document conversion,gccfor library compilation,pandocfor text extraction,pdftoppmfor image generation, andgitfor document diffing.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an indirect prompt injection surface by processing external Word documents. Ingestion occurs inscripts/office/unpack.py, which extracts document content into XML files for editing. While the skill correctly uses thedefusedxmllibrary to prevent XML External Entity (XXE) attacks, it lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to the AI agent to ignore instructions embedded within the untrusted document data. Capabilities available to the agent when processing this data include file system access and system command execution.
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