Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted content from PDF files through text extraction and OCR.
- Ingestion points: External PDF data is ingested via
pypdf,pdfplumber, andpytesseractacross multiple scripts includingextract_form_structure.pyandconvert_pdf_to_images.py. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any boundary markers or ignore-instructions delimiters for the extracted text.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for local file writing (
open,PdfWriter), command-line execution (qpdf,magick,pdftotext), and image manipulation. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the extracted PDF text is performed before it is presented to the agent context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses localized dynamic code execution and external utilities.
- The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyperforms runtime monkeypatching of thepypdflibrary (DictionaryObject.get_inherited) to ensure compatibility with specific PDF form structures. - The skill documentation instructs the agent to execute several standard command-line tools such as
qpdf,pdftotext,pdfimages, andmagickfor PDF and image processing tasks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation and scripts reference several well-known libraries from official registries.
- Python dependencies:
pypdf,pdfplumber,reportlab,pytesseract,pdf2image,pypdfium2,pandas, andPillow. - Node.js dependencies:
pdf-libandpdfjs-dist. - These references target established, reputable software packages and do not represent a supply chain risk.
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