Requirements Engineering
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill defines shell logic in
SKILL.mdandreferences/beads-integration.mdthat directly interpolates user-provided variables like$FEATURE_TITLE,$criterion, and$promptinto shell commands for thebd(Beads) CLI. For example, the commandEPIC_ID=$(bd create --type epic --title "$FEATURE_TITLE")is highly susceptible to command injection if the user input contains shell metacharacters like semicolons or pipes. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The command injection vulnerability in the requirement extraction and task creation logic provides a direct path for remote code execution on the host system where the agent executes these scripts.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill relies on an external, unverified CLI utility named
bd. The security of this dependency is not established, representing a supply chain risk. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill processes untrusted user prompts to generate technical tasks without using boundary markers or sanitization. Evidence: 1. Ingestion points: User prompts are captured in variables within
SKILL.md. 2. Boundary markers: None identified. 3. Capability inventory: Execution ofbdCLI commands. 4. Sanitization: Relies on simplegreppatterns that do not prevent malicious command sequences.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata