skills-sync
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
cmd_installfunction inscripts/sync.pyusessubprocess.runto execute agit clonecommand using a source URL provided as an argument. This enables the agent to download and potentially execute arbitrary code from remote sources. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Python
subprocessandshutilmodules to perform system-level operations, including executing shell commands for Git and performing recursive directory deletions and copies on the local filesystem. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
installcommand facilitates downloading content from external repositories (via HTTP/HTTPS or SSH) into the user's local skill directories. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The script includes an indirect prompt injection surface in the
_get_skill_descriptionfunction withinscripts/sync.py. This function reads the description field fromSKILL.mdfiles and displays it in thelistcommand output. A maliciously crafted skill file could embed instructions within its metadata that the agent might inadvertently follow during a listing or status operation. - Ingestion points:
scripts/sync.pyreads data fromSKILL.mdfiles in various local and project directories. - Boundary markers: None detected; the script parses lines starting with 'description:' directly.
- Capability inventory: Uses
subprocess.runfor Git commands andshutilfor file management. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the text extracted from skill metadata before it is displayed to the agent context.
Audit Metadata