skills-sync

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The cmd_install function in scripts/sync.py uses subprocess.run to execute a git clone command using a source URL provided as an argument. This enables the agent to download and potentially execute arbitrary code from remote sources.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Python subprocess and shutil modules to perform system-level operations, including executing shell commands for Git and performing recursive directory deletions and copies on the local filesystem.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The install command facilitates downloading content from external repositories (via HTTP/HTTPS or SSH) into the user's local skill directories.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The script includes an indirect prompt injection surface in the _get_skill_description function within scripts/sync.py. This function reads the description field from SKILL.md files and displays it in the list command output. A maliciously crafted skill file could embed instructions within its metadata that the agent might inadvertently follow during a listing or status operation.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/sync.py reads data from SKILL.md files in various local and project directories.
  • Boundary markers: None detected; the script parses lines starting with 'description:' directly.
  • Capability inventory: Uses subprocess.run for Git commands and shutil for file management.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the text extracted from skill metadata before it is displayed to the agent context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 1, 2026, 08:44 PM