effect-ts

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill provides patterns for MCP server tool handlers that are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the input parameter in the searchTool example in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No boundary markers or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings are present in the provided tool handler templates.
  • Capability inventory: The tool demonstrates a database write/execute capability via db.query(args.query), which maps to runQuery(sql, config) in the provided service layer.
  • Sanitization: While structural validation is performed via @effect/schema, the resulting data is interpolated directly into a query string, creating a significant SQL injection surface.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill requires the installation of multiple external packages (effect, @effect/schema, @effect/opentelemetry) from the effect-ts organization. While widely used, this organization is not on the provided Trusted External Sources list, making the dependencies unverifiable by strict policy.
  • [MALICIOUS_URL_ALERT] (INFO): An automated scan flagged Layer.su as a phishing URL. This is identified as a false positive; the string is a prefix of the common library method Layer.succeed used in the code snippets, and no such domain is actually referenced in the file content.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
  • Contains 1 malicious URL(s) - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 15, 2026, 08:55 PM