retrospective
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Attack Surface
- Ingestion points: The skill actively monitors and reads the current conversation transcript (Step 1 and Step 2) to identify friction signals and corrections provided by the user.
- Boundary markers: The instructions state to 'Quote the user's actual words' when presenting findings, but there is no explicit sanitization or filtering to prevent malicious instructions embedded in those quotes from being accepted as new rules.
- Capability inventory: The skill has broad write access to core agent instruction files located in
~/.claude/.context/core/, includingrules.md,preferences.md, andworkflows.md. - Sanitization: The skill includes a human-in-the-loop mitigation (Step 4: Present findings interactively) requiring user confirmation before writing to disk. This reduces the risk of accidental poisoning but does not prevent an adversarial user from intentionally poisoning the system prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Sensitive File System Operations
- The skill performs direct read and write operations on several sensitive configuration files that dictate the agent's core behavior:
~/.claude/.context/core/rules.md,~/.claude/.context/core/preferences.md,~/.claude/.context/core/workflows.md, and~/.claude/.context/core/improvements.md. - Modification of these files constitutes a persistence mechanism where changes to the agent's instructions remain active across different projects and sessions.
Audit Metadata