agentmail

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from incoming emails, which presents an indirect prompt injection surface where an external sender could attempt to manipulate the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the system through email message text and subjects processed via webhooks as described in references/WEBHOOKS.md.
  • Boundary markers: The documentation in SKILL.md provides recommendations for implementing sender allowlists and using untrusted content markers, but these are not natively enforced by the skill's implementation.
  • Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to send emails, reply to threads, and manage inboxes via the agentmail-cli script and Python SDK. Examples in references/EXAMPLES.md also demonstrate potential integration with GitHub and Slack.
  • Sanitization: No automatic sanitization or validation of the email body is performed by the skill; remediation steps are provided for the user to implement custom filtering logic.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on external libraries for its core functionality.
  • Evidence: Installation instructions in README.md and references/WEBHOOKS.md specify dependencies on agentmail, flask, ngrok, python-dotenv, pdfplumber, and requests via package managers.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 16, 2026, 05:46 PM