phone-agent

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 4, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The /outbound and /call API endpoints in server.py allow the agent's system prompt to be replaced or extended via the request body. Since the skill is designed to be exposed to the internet via tools like ngrok without built-in authentication, an attacker could trigger calls with malicious instructions.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes live audio transcripts from callers in server.py and appends them directly to the conversation_history without sanitization or boundary markers.\n
  • Ingestion points: Caller audio is transcribed via the Deepgram WebSocket in server.py.\n
  • Boundary markers: None present; user speech is treated as direct instruction history.\n
  • Capability inventory: The agent can execute ffmpeg, perform web searches, and make outbound calls.\n
  • Sanitization: No transcript filtering or safety checks are performed.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In server.py, the _transcode_mp3_to_mulaw function executes the ffmpeg binary using asyncio.create_subprocess_exec. While the arguments are not derived from user input, this adds a capability to execute system binaries.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill connects to official APIs for OpenAI, Deepgram, Twilio, and Brave Search. These are well-known technology providers and the connections are required for the skill's primary functionality.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 4, 2026, 04:26 PM