bf-lead-orchestrate

[Skill Scanner] Installation of third-party script detected All findings: [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] This skill file is an orchestration spec that requires read/write access to repository files and the ability to spawn autonomous sub-agents and run shell scripts. It contains no direct indicators of malware (no hardcoded secrets, obfuscated payloads, or network exfiltration instructions). However, it grants high-privilege automated control over repo state and execution of arbitrary shell scripts, and it explicitly removes human-in-the-loop checks. That combination makes it potentially dangerous operationally if the agent runtime or spawned agents are compromised or misconfigured. Overall assessment: not obviously malicious code, but high-risk automation — treat as SUSPICIOUS in supply-chain context and restrict execution to trusted environments with audit/logging and limited privileges. LLM verification: This SKILL.md defines a repository-local orchestrator that reads and mutates sprint-status and other project files and spawns subordinate agent-skills, which is consistent with its stated purpose. I find no direct malicious code or obfuscation in the provided content. The primary risk is operational: the orchestrator passes local file paths (and therefore potentially sensitive file contents) to spawned agents (models), and the documentation enforces fully autonomous operation with no human overs