skills/khw1031/ai-library/note-writer/Gen Agent Trust Hub

note-writer

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 20, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill workflow (SKILL.md) and reference guides (categories.md, linking.md) rely on executing shell commands such as grep, find, and ln -s to search for existing notes and manage the project structure.
  • [Data Exposure] (MEDIUM): The input analysis phase (SKILL.md) explicitly instructs the agent to read content from user-provided 'file paths'. An adversary could provide paths to sensitive local files (e.g., ~/.ssh/id_rsa, .env) to have the agent summarize or expose their contents.
  • [Dynamic Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill creates symbolic links using ln -s with paths derived from category and topic names. Maliciously crafted names containing path traversal sequences (e.g., ../../) could potentially be used to link sensitive system directories into the agent's workspace.
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill ingests untrusted data from URLs (via WebFetch) and files. Instructions embedded within these external sources could attempt to influence the agent's output or note-writing behavior.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md (Workflow Step 1) mentions 'WebFetch' for URLs and reading content from file paths.
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the provided templates; external content is processed directly.
  • Capability inventory: Shell execution (grep, find, ln -s), file system read/write, and network access (WebFetch).
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the input 'file paths' or URL content is described.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 20, 2026, 03:18 PM