coding-agent

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to use the --yolo flag with the Codex CLI, which is described as a shortcut for --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox. Bypassing these security controls allows the agent to execute arbitrary generated code without human oversight or technical restrictions.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the @mariozechner/pi-coding-agent package via npm install -g, which is a third-party dependency from a non-whitelisted source. It also utilizes pnpm install within temporary worktrees and clones external repositories using git clone.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a wide array of shell commands to manage background processes and interactive coding environments, including bash, tmux, git, and gh. It provides a mechanism to programmatically write to and kill these processes.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates an indirect prompt injection surface through its PR review workflow. (1) Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via git clone and gh pr checkout of external code. (2) Boundary markers: No boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the recommended prompt templates. (3) Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including shell execution (bash), process control, and network interaction (gh). (4) Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the external content before it is processed by the AI coding agents.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 10, 2026, 03:24 AM