remotion-best-practices
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill defines patterns that ingest untrusted data into the agent's decision-making flow.
- In
rules/calculate-metadata.md, it demonstrates fetching JSON from a URL and returning it directly as component props, which can influence downstream rendering logic or metadata decisions. - In
rules/tailwind.md, the skill explicitly instructs the agent to "fetch https://www.remotion.dev/docs/tailwind using WebFetch for instructions," creating a vulnerability where an external site can dictate the agent's behavior. - External Downloads & Remote Code Execution (HIGH): The skill promotes the installation of third-party binaries and packages.
rules/transcribe-captions.mdincludes code to download and installwhisper.cpp(a binary) and its models from external sources.- It also includes code that would likely trigger subprocess execution via the
transcribefunction. - Command Execution (MEDIUM): Throughout the skill (e.g.,
rules/3d.md,rules/audio.md,rules/parameters.md), the agent is provided with shell commands (npx,npm,yarn,bun,pnpm) to modify the project's dependency state. While standard for the framework, these are powerful capabilities if misused. - Data Ingestion Surface (MEDIUM): Multiple files (
rules/display-captions.md,rules/lottie.md,rules/import-srt-captions.md) implement patterns to fetch and parse external formats (JSON, SRT, Lottie) without explicit sanitization or boundary markers, increasing the risk of indirect injection from attacker-controlled assets.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata