github-to-skills
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill ingests untrusted data from external GitHub repositories to generate instructions for new skills.
- Ingestion points:
fetch_github_info.pyfetches the repository name and README content. - Boundary markers: None; the content is directly spliced into the generated
SKILL.mdfile using f-strings increate_github_skill.py. - Capability inventory: The skill performs file writing and creates executable scripts.
- Sanitization: None; malicious instructions in a README could override the agent's behavior when it later processes the generated skill.
- Command Injection (MEDIUM): The
fetch_github_info.pyscript usessubprocess.run(['git', 'ls-remote', url, 'HEAD']). While using a list is safer than a shell string, certain git protocols or crafted URLs can still lead to command execution in some environments. - Code Injection (HIGH): The script
create_github_skill.pygenerates awrapper.pyscript using the untrustedrepo_name. This allows an attacker to place malicious strings into a script template that the agent is explicitly instructed to 'implement' or execute later.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata