neat-freak
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It is designed to ingest and process arbitrary data from the local project and agent environment, which could be controlled by a third party.
- Ingestion points: In
SKILL.md(Step 1), the agent is instructed to usels,find, and read commands to ingest content fromREADME.md,CLAUDE.md, all files indocs/, and platform-specific memory directories (e.g.,~/.claude/projects/*/memory/). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack boundary markers or explicit directives to ignore instructions embedded within the processed documentation files.
- Capability inventory: The skill explicitly directs the agent to use
Edit,Write, and file deletion tools to modify the project structure and agent state (Step 3). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the content read from external files before it is used to influence the agent's editing actions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes standard shell utilities such as
ls,find, andgrep(Step 1 and Step 4) to navigate the filesystem and identify documentation that requires synchronization. These commands are used to discover files rather than to execute arbitrary external payloads.
Audit Metadata