nano-banana
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 19, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (HIGH): The skill instructs users and the agent to install an extension from an unverified GitHub organization (
gemini-cli-extensions). This repository is not part of the trusted list and represents a significant supply chain risk. - REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The installation process for the
nanobananaextension involves downloading and executing remote code via thegemini extensions installcommand. When combined with instructions to use the--yoloflag, this allows for unprompted execution of third-party code. - COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The instructions explicitly mandate the use of the
--yoloflag for all operations. This flag is designed to suppress user confirmation prompts for tool actions, effectively removing the human-in-the-loop security boundary and allowing potentially malicious commands to run without oversight. - METADATA_POISONING (LOW): The README references a package
@anthropic-ai/gemini-cli. This appears to be a misleading package name, as Gemini is a Google product and the provided link points to thegoogle-geminirepository. This could lead to the installation of a typosquatted or malicious npm package. - PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill uses assertive language in its metadata ('REQUIRED for all image generation requests', 'ALWAYS use this skill') which attempts to override the agent's internal logic for tool selection.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata