gh
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill facilitates reading untrusted external data (issue comments, PR descriptions) which can contain malicious instructions. Combined with the agent's ability to merge code, delete resources, or post comments, this creates a significant attack surface.
- Ingestion points:
gh issue view,gh pr view,gh api, and various search commands inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None provided in the instructions to separate untrusted data from system instructions.
- Capability inventory:
gh pr merge,gh repo create,gh issue comment,gh gist create, andgh workflow runprovide significant side-effect capabilities. - Sanitization: None present; the agent is expected to process raw output from the GitHub API.
- [Data Exfiltration] (MEDIUM): Commands like
gh gist createandgh release createallow the agent to upload local files or sensitive data to external GitHub endpoints, which could be used to exfiltrate secrets or source code. - [External Downloads] (MEDIUM): Commands such as
gh repo cloneandgh release downloadenable the fetching of arbitrary remote code or binaries into the local execution environment. - [Persistence Mechanisms] (LOW): The skill includes documentation for using
tmuxto run background processes (gh run watch), which could be leveraged to maintain long-running unauthorized activity across sessions.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata