Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill's primary purpose is to ingest untrusted external data from PDF files.
- Ingestion points: Uses
pypdf.PdfReader,pdfplumber.open, andpytesseractto extract content from files likedocument.pdfandscanned.pdf. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or instructions to treat extracted text as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill is granted
Bash,Write, andEditpermissions in its frontmatter. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of extracted text is performed before it enters the agent's context.
- [Metadata Poisoning] (MEDIUM): The skill references external files
forms.mdandreference.mdfor 'instructions' and 'advanced features.' These files are missing from the package, creating a risk where an agent might be directed to follow unverified or malicious instructions if those files are provided by an external source. - [Command Execution] (HIGH): The explicit inclusion of the
Bashtool in theallowed-toolslist, combined with the logic to process external content, creates a direct vector for command injection if the agent is persuaded to execute shell commands based on text found inside a processed PDF.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata