git-pushing
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): Indirect Prompt Injection vulnerability (Category 8). The skill reads external content via
git diffto analyze changes. Evidence: 1. Ingestion point:git diffoutput in the 'Create Commit Message' step. 2. Boundary markers: Absent; raw diff content is processed. 3. Capability inventory: Commands likegit push(network access) andgit add(file state modification) are available. 4. Sanitization: Absent; no filtering or escaping of the diff content is performed. This allows malicious code comments to influence the agent's behavior. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (HIGH): The skill uses
git pushto send data to remote repositories. While a standard feature, it serves as an exfiltration vector if sensitive files are accidentally staged or if the agent is manipulated into pushing to an external, attacker-controlled remote. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill uses
git add .to stage all changes. This is a best-practice violation as it may inadvertently stage sensitive files (credentials, keys, or .env files) not covered by a .gitignore, making them available for the subsequent push.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata