spec-driven-propose

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 25, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands, specifically ls .spec-driven/ to verify project initialization and node {{SKILL_DIR}}/scripts/spec-driven.js to scaffold and verify artifacts.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The command node {{SKILL_DIR}}/scripts/spec-driven.js propose <name> incorporates a user-provided string (<name>) directly into the shell execution. This presents a risk of command injection if the agent or the underlying execution environment does not adequately sanitize the input (e.g., if a user provides a name like my-change; rm -rf /).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it treats external project data as authoritative instructions.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads .spec-driven/config.yaml and all markdown files within .spec-driven/specs/ to inform its generation logic.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat the content of these files as untrusted data or to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to read project files, write new files to the filesystem, and execute shell commands.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The skill explicitly instructs the agent to treat rules within the external config.yaml as "binding constraints," which could be exploited by an attacker to override the agent's behavior via a malicious project configuration.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 25, 2026, 07:34 AM