GitHub CLI Operations
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill exhibits a significant Indirect Prompt Injection surface. It is designed to ingest and process attacker-controlled content from GitHub Pull Requests (titles, bodies, and comments) to perform actions like extracting issue IDs and interacting with the Linear platform.
- Ingestion points: Data is fetched via
gh pr viewcommands inSKILL.mdwhich extract thetitleandbodyfields. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions provided to the agent to treat this external data as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill description explicitly mentions creating PR comments and integrating with Linear MCP functions based on the ingested data.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is defined for the extracted strings before they are used in downstream logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill relies on the execution of the GitHub CLI (
gh) and shell utilities likegrepthrough the system shell. - Evidence: Examples in
SKILL.mdshow direct usage ofgh pr view ... | grep -oE. This increases the risk that an agent might be manipulated into executing broader, unintended shell commands if the prompt context is not strictly controlled.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata