langchain-rag

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [Unsafe Deserialization Surface]: The skill demonstrates the use of the allow_dangerous_deserialization=True flag when loading FAISS vector store indexes.
  • Context: The Python implementation of FAISS uses pickle to store metadata, which can execute code if an untrusted index file is loaded.
  • Observation: The skill includes explicit security warnings and educational sections contrast correctly and incorrectly loading these files, advising users to only load indexes they have created and control.
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection Surface]: The skill contains patterns for ingesting external data from PDFs, web pages, and directories into LLM prompts.
  • Ingestion Points: PyPDFLoader, WebBaseLoader, and DirectoryLoader are used in SKILL.md to fetch data from potentially untrusted sources.
  • Capability Inventory: Ingested content is passed directly to LLM generation via model.invoke and is used as context for AI agents.
  • Boundary Markers: The examples show context being interpolated into system prompts (e.g., Use this context:\n\n{context}) without explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Sanitization: The provided examples do not include sanitization or filtering logic for the external content before it is processed by the model.
  • [External Content Retrieval]: The skill uses WebBaseLoader to fetch content from external URLs.
  • Context: This is a standard feature for RAG systems to build knowledge bases from web documentation. In the context of this skill, it targets official documentation sites.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 07:43 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — langchain-rag