The Agent Skills Directory

[PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it analyzes untrusted file content to drive its decision-making. An attacker who can influence the code being committed (e.g., via a PR or a downloaded file) can embed instructions in comments or documentation that the AI might interpret as commands for the 'commit' or 'merge' operations.
Ingestion points: The skill executes git diff, git diff --cached, and git status to 'Analyze changes' and 'determine type/scope'.
Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety instructions are used to separate the code content from the agent's internal reasoning logic.
Capability inventory: The skill has write access to the filesystem (git commit) and network access via git push and git pull.
Sanitization: There is no filtering of the content extracted from the diffs before it is used to generate the commit message.
[COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill relies on direct execution of shell commands (git). While necessary for functionality, the lack of input sanitization for user-provided arguments in the [operation] [args] pattern could lead to command injection if the agent's shell environment is not properly restricted.
[DATA_EXFILTRATION] (LOW): The push operation is a legitimate feature but represents an exfiltration vector. If an agent is tricked into staging sensitive files (like .env), the push operation would move those files to a remote server without further validation beyond a 'confirmation' which may be bypassed via prompt injection.

git