bear-notes
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/bearis vulnerable to SQL injection due to the lack of sanitization when interpolating user-provided variables into SQLite queries. - Evidence: In
cmd_search(lines 105-117), the${term}and${tag}variables are inserted directly intosqlite3query strings. - Evidence: In
cmd_open(lines 122-125), the${id}variable is interpolated into the query. - Evidence: In
cmd_open_title(lines 149-152), the${title}variable is interpolated into the query. - Evidence: In
cmd_tag(lines 187-190), the${name}variable is used in aLIKEclause. - Evidence: Similar patterns are found in
cmd_untagged(lines 201-203),cmd_todos(lines 230-233), andcmd_today(lines 255-257). - Impact: An attacker can craft inputs to manipulate the SQL logic, potentially leaking sensitive note content or bypassing search constraints.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes note content from the Bear database without sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/bear(functionscmd_search,cmd_open,cmd_todos). - Boundary markers: None. Retrieved note content is returned to the agent without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill can read all notes via
sqlite3and modify notes/tags viaopen bear://x-callback-url. - Sanitization: None. Note text is used as-is.
- Impact: Malicious instructions stored in a note could be executed by the agent when searching or reading notes, leading to unauthorized actions like deleting notes.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata