pptx-processing-anthropic

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses system utilities to perform document conversion and comparison tasks:
  • Executes soffice (LibreOffice) for converting presentations to PDF and for headless validation in ooxml/scripts/pack.py and scripts/thumbnail.py.
  • Executes pdftoppm (Poppler) to convert PDF pages into JPEG images in scripts/thumbnail.py.
  • Executes git diff to perform character-level comparison of document revisions in ooxml/scripts/validation/redlining.py.
  • Launches a Chromium browser instance via playwright to render HTML slides in scripts/html2pptx.js.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on several standard packages from official registries (PyPI and NPM), including playwright, sharp, pptxgenjs, and markitdown.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains patterns that override default agent tool behaviors:
  • Explicitly instructs the agent to ignore tool range limits (e.g., "NEVER set any range limits") when reading documentation and inventory files to ensure full content consumption.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: There is a potential surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8) due to the ingestion of untrusted external content:
  • Ingestion points: Text extraction from user-provided .pptx files via markitdown and scripts/inventory.py; rendering of user-influenced HTML slides in scripts/html2pptx.js.
  • Boundary markers: Missing explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within extracted slide content.
  • Capability inventory: Significant capabilities including file system write access, system command execution, and browser rendering.
  • Sanitization: Lacks explicit instructions for sanitizing content extracted from slides before it is processed by the agent's reasoning engine.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 7, 2026, 08:11 PM