vscode-extension-builder-lawvable

[Skill Scanner] Installation of third-party script detected All findings: [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [CRITICAL] command_injection: Installation of third-party script detected (SC006) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] [HIGH] data_exfiltration: Credential file access detected (DE002) [AITech 8.2.3] The document describes a legitimate toolkit for building VS Code extensions. There is no explicit malicious code, hardcoded secrets, obfuscation, or network connections to suspicious domains in the provided fragment. However, the file-bridge pattern (fs.watch reading JSON command files and calling processCommand) is a high-risk capability if implemented to execute arbitrary instructions without strict validation or if the watched directory is writable by untrusted parties. Treat the pattern as a potential privilege-escalation or command-execution vector until the implementation of processCommand and access controls are reviewed. Overall: not obviously malicious, but moderately risky and deserving of careful review and hardening. LLM verification: The documentation and snippets align with the intended purpose of scaffolding VS Code extensions and integrating AI agents via a file-bridge. There are no explicit indicators of obfuscated/malicious code in the provided text. The highest security concern is the file-bridge IPC pattern (fs.watch + JSON.parse -> processCommand) which, if the watched directory is writable by untrusted actors or commands are not validated/authorized, provides a clear local command injection vector. Additional supply