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Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 22, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): Potential for arbitrary command execution in
references/invoke-skill.md. The skill executes.claude/hooks/workflows/write-session-state.sh "{topic}" ..., where{topic}is a value parsed from the frontmatter of localplan.mdfiles viadiscovery.sh. A malicious file could include shell metacharacters in the topic field (e.g.,test\"; touch /tmp/pwned; \") to execute commands when the session state is saved. - [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): Indirect prompt injection surface. The skill reads and processes metadata from multiple user-controlled Markdown files in the project workspace.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/discovery.shscript extracts fields such astopic,status, andplan_idfrom files indocs/workflow/planning/. - Boundary markers: Missing. Data is extracted and presented to the agent as YAML without delimiters or safety warnings to ignore instructions within the data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool and executes several local shell scripts (discovery.sh,system-check.sh,write-session-state.sh). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the extracted metadata before it is used in prompts or shell command strings.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata