builderbot-code-skill
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input from chatbot platforms, creating an indirect prompt injection surface.\n
- Ingestion points: The
ctx.bodyproperty is accessed inSKILL.mdandpatterns.mdto process incoming messages.\n - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore" instructions are used to wrap user input in the provided code patterns.\n
- Capability inventory: The bot can perform network requests (
fetchinpatterns.md), file operations (provider.saveFileinpatterns.md), and send outgoing messages (bot.sendMessageinpatterns.md).\n - Sanitization: Basic validation logic (e.g., regex for emails) is demonstrated in
patterns.md, but there is no universal sanitization of thectx.bodyinput.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation includes deployment instructions that recommend granting high-privilege capabilities to the bot container.\n - Evidence:
providers.mdcontains a Docker command using the--cap-add SYS_ADMINflag.\n - Context: This privilege is noted as necessary for the Baileys provider which relies on Chromium-based automation.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides patterns for the bot to transmit data to external servers via network operations.\n
- Evidence:
patterns.mddemonstrates using thefetchAPI to send user data (such as phone numbers) to an external API endpoint (https://my.app/api/check).
Audit Metadata