stitch-design

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface identified in the design system synthesis workflow where the agent processes untrusted external data.
  • Ingestion points: In workflows/generate-design-md.md, the agent is instructed to use read_url_content to fetch HTML code from remote URLs for analysis.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not include delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions within the fetched HTML content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the Write tool to create local files (.stitch/DESIGN.md) and interacts with the StitchMCP service, which could be influenced by malicious instructions in the ingested data.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no mention of validating or filtering the remote HTML content before processing it for design synthesis.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs remote downloads of assets to the local filesystem.
  • Evidence: Workflows in workflows/text-to-design.md and workflows/edit-design.md instruct the agent to download HTML and screenshots from URLs provided by the Stitch MCP tool output and save them to the .stitch/designs directory.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use shell commands for file management.
  • Evidence: In workflows/text-to-design.md, the instructions explicitly suggest using curl -o via run_command to perform the asset downloads to the local project environment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 24, 2026, 12:14 AM