initializing-memory

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) due to the way it ingests and processes external data.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads various project files (e.g., README.md, package.json), git logs, and local application history files (~/.claude/history.jsonl, ~/.codex/history.jsonl).
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions to use delimiters or to treat ingested content as data rather than instructions; the agent is simply told to "analyze" and "cross-reference" the findings.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes powerful tools including shell command execution (bash, git), filesystem manipulation (mkdir, mv), and the ability to spawn parallel subagents (Task tool).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or filtering is performed on the data read from external sources before it is processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary functionality relies on executing a variety of shell commands to manage the memory filesystem.
  • Evidence: The instructions direct the agent to use mkdir -p, mv, ls, wc, split, and git (merge, push, worktree) to organize files within the ~/.letta/ directory.
  • Note: While these commands are consistent with the skill's stated purpose of memory management, the combination of shell access and untrusted data ingestion increases the overall risk surface.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Feb 28, 2026, 10:00 AM