mcp-builder
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): The
MCPConnectionStdioclass inscripts/connections.pyutilizesmcp.client.stdio.stdio_clientto spawn subprocesses. This allows for arbitrary command execution on the host machine if thecommandorargsparameters are not strictly validated. - REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill's primary function is to run and interact with MCP servers. Executing unverified local binaries or connecting to untrusted remote servers provides a direct path for remote code execution.
- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): Through
MCPConnectionSSEandMCPConnectionHTTP, the skill can connect to arbitrary network endpoints. This facilitates Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) if the target URL is provided by an untrusted source. - DATA_EXFILTRATION (MEDIUM): The network transport classes (SSE and HTTP) can be abused to transmit sensitive information from the agent's environment to external servers controlled by an attacker.
- INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (HIGH):
- Ingestion points:
scripts/connections.pyin thecall_toolmethod, which ingests raw data from external tools/servers. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not implement delimiters or warnings to treat external tool output as untrusted.
- Capability inventory: Includes subprocess execution (
stdio_client) and network requests (sse_client,streamablehttp_client). - Sanitization: Absent. Data returned from MCP tools is passed back to the agent without any filtering or validation.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata