pytorch-model-cli
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Dynamic Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill utilizes
torch.load(), which performs deserialization via thepicklemodule. Loading untrusted.pthfiles is a known vector for arbitrary code execution. - [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill establishes a surface for processing untrusted external inputs. 1. Ingestion points: PyTorch checkpoints (
model.pth), image files (via lodepng), and weight files (via cJSON). 2. Boundary markers: Absent; the workflow relies on manual documentation and verification. 3. Capability inventory: Usesg++for compilation and subsequent execution of the resulting binary. 4. Sanitization: Recommends verifying layer dimensions and handling missing files, though implementation safety is left to the agent. - [Dynamic Execution] (LOW): The skill provides a template for generating and compiling C++ code. While inherent to the task, this capability could be exploited if the agent is influenced by malicious instructions embedded in the model architecture or weights.
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