lev-cdo
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically loads agent instructions and mental models from a local catalog using the
lev-catalogCLI (found inskill-discovery/SKILL.md). This involves computing paths to skill definitions (e.g.,~/lev/workshop/poc/skills/domains/...) at runtime based on semantic search results. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Extensive use of shell commands and internal CLI tools (
lev,bd,find) to automate directory creation, file indexing, and metadata tracking across the filesystem, including paths within the user's home directory (~/.lev/). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it ingests and processes untrusted data (user queries, bug reports, and research artifacts) across multi-turn agent chains without explicit sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Raw user queries are accepted via the
lev cdocommand and processed by therouter/SKILL.md. Error descriptions are ingested by thedebug/SKILL.mdworkflow. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions for the interpolated user content within its agent prompts.
- Capability inventory: The system possesses high-level capabilities including file system read/write access (
tmp/,~/.lev/), execution of system commands via thelevCLI, and the ability to dispatch secondary agents via theTasktool. - Sanitization: No evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering was found in the prompt templates or orchestration logic.
Audit Metadata